Quantum cryptography using partially entangled states by Gordon, Goren & Rigolin, Gustavo
ar
X
iv
:0
80
7.
22
34
v2
  [
qu
an
t-p
h]
  1
9 N
ov
 20
09
Quantum cryptography using partially entangled states
Goren Gordona and Gustavo Rigolinb,1
a Department of Chemical Physics, Weizmann Institute of Science, Rehovot 76100, Israel
b Departamento de Fisica, Universidade Federal de Sao Carlos, Caixa Postal 676, Sao
Carlos, 13565-905, SP, Brazil
Abstract
We show that non-maximally entangled states can be used to build a quan-
tum key distribution (QKD) scheme where the key is probabilistically tele-
ported from Alice to Bob. This probabilistic aspect of the protocol ensures
the security of the key without the need of non-orthogonal states to encode
it, in contrast to other QKD schemes. Also, the security and key transmis-
sion rate of the present protocol is nearly equivalent to those of standard
QKD schemes and these aspects can be controlled by properly harnessing
the new free parameter in the present proposal, namely, the degree of par-
tial entanglement. Furthermore, we discuss how to build a controlled QKD
scheme, also based on partially entangled states, where a third party can
decide whether or not Alice and Bob are allowed to share a key.
Key words: Quantum communication, Quantum cryptography and
communication security, Entanglement production and manipulation
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1. Introduction
The ability to communicate secretly is considered one of the most impor-
tant challenges of the information era [1]. For all practical purposes most
modern public key systems can be considered secure [2]. However, this secu-
rity is not based on any mathematical proof but on the belief that there is no
classical algorithm to factorize huge prime numbers in a reasonable amount
of time. Some classical cyphers, such as the one-time pad [1], do not have
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the aforementioned problem. They are private key protocols whose security
is entirely based on a random string of bits, the key, which only the sender
(Alice) and the receiver (Bob) should know. Once the key is secretly trans-
mitted the communication is absolutely secure. The drawback with these
cyphers is that any key transmitted through a classical channel can be pas-
sively monitored. Although it may be technologically difficult to get the key
without being noticed, it is in principle possible.
The solution of the key transmission problem based on the laws of physics
was presented for the first time by Bennett and Brassard in a seminal work
[3]. Making use of quantum channels (polarized photons) the authors theo-
retically showed the possibility to share a secret key with absolute security
if the laws of quantum mechanics are correct. They have shown that any in-
terference of an eavesdropper (Eve) on the quantum channel can be detected
by Alice and Bob at the end of the protocol. Other interesting schemes were
later proposed [4, 5], in particular the E91 protocol which was the first QKD
scheme that employed maximally entangled states [4]. For an extensive re-
view on other protocols and on experimental feasibilities we refer the reader
to Ref. [6].
In this contribution we present a new QKD scheme that uses directly non-
maximally entangled states (no entanglement concentration needed) and the
probabilistic quantum teleportation protocol (PQT) [7, 8]. Nevertheless, the
present scheme resembles the BB84 [3] rather than the E91 [4] protocol,
i.e., although we make use of entanglement there is no need to check for
violation of any Bell inequality to assure the security of the shared key. It
is the probabilistic aspect of the PQT that guarantees the security of the
teleported key and, as we show later, also allows it to be encoded in a set of
orthogonal states. Note that in BB84-like protocols it is mandatory to encode
the key in non-orthogonal states to make sure its transmission is secure.
In contrast to other protocols, where departure from maximal entangle-
ment makes them inoperable, our scheme exploits partial entanglement and,
using a special generalized Bell measurement, ensures flawless key distribu-
tion. Furthermore, this new QKD scheme takes advantage of a new free
parameter, namely the degree of partial entanglement, that enables more
control over the security and transmission rate of the protocol. Indeed, as
explained later, this freedom allows us to introduce a minor modification
in the QKD scheme that turns it into a controlled QKD protocol, where a
third party (Charlie) has the final word on whether or not Alice and Bob
are allowed to share a secret key, even after all steps of the protocol were
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implemented. It is also worth mentioning that Charlie decides whether or
not Alice and Bob will share a key without ever knowing it, a feature that
has practical applications. We also show other possible interesting extensions
of the basic protocol and how we can improve its security and the reliability
of the transmitted key.
2. The tools
One important ingredient in this QKD protocol, and the one that al-
lows it to depart from E91-like protocols, is the use of partially entangled
states to transmit the secret key from one party to the other. Indeed, as we
will show, by playing with different kinds of partially entangled states and
with different joint measurement basis, Alice can teleport to Bob a secret
key. The other ingredient is, as anticipated in the last sentence, the proper
use of a probabilistic teleportation protocol, which allows us to harness the
teleporting power of a non-maximally pure entangled state.
Let us start by recalling the PQT as developed in Ref. [7] and extended
in Ref. [8]. As usual, Alice wants to teleport the following qubit to Bob,
|φA〉 = α|0〉+ β|1〉, (1)
where α and β are arbitrary complex numbers such that |α|2 + |β|2 =
1. Contrary to the original proposal [9] Alice and Bob now share a non-
maximally entangled state, |Φ+n 〉 = N(|00〉 + n|11〉), with 0 < |n| < 1 and
N = 1/
√
1 + |n|2, which naturally leads to the following orthonormal basis,
|Φ+m〉 = (|00〉+m|11〉)/
√
1 + |m|2, (2)
|Φ−m〉 = (m∗|00〉 − |11〉)/
√
1 + |m|2, (3)
|Ψ+m〉 = (|01〉+m|10〉)/
√
1 + |m|2, (4)
|Ψ−m〉 = (m∗|01〉 − |10〉)/
√
1 + |m|2, (5)
with m∗ denoting the complex conjugate of m andM = 1/
√
1 + |m|2. Using
the generalized Bell states (GBS) above we can rewrite the three qubit state
belonging to Alice and Bob as, |Φ〉 = |φA〉 ⊗ |Φ+n 〉 = MN (|Φ+m〉 (α|0〉 +
nm∗β|1〉) + |Φ−m〉 (mα|0〉 − nβ|1〉) + |Ψ+m〉 (m∗β|0〉 + nα|1〉) + |Ψ−m〉 (−β|0〉
+ nmα|1〉)), with the first two qubits being with Alice and the last one with
Bob. Alice now proceeds by implementing a generalized Bell measurement
(GBM), i.e., she projects her two qubits onto one of the four GBS. (Ref.
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[10] discusses three possible ways to experimentally implement a GBM.) The
probability to obtain a given GBS is,
P
Φ
+
m
=
(|α|2 + |mnβ|2) /[(1 + |m|2)(1 + |n|2)], (6)
P
Φ
−
m
=
(|mα|2 + |nβ|2) /[(1 + |m|2)(1 + |n|2)], (7)
P
Ψ
+
m
=
(|nα|2 + |mβ|2) /[(1 + |m|2)(1 + |n|2)], (8)
P
Ψ
−
m
=
(|mnα|2 + |β|2) /[(1 + |m|2)(1 + |n|2)]. (9)
Alice then sends Bob the result of her measurement (two bits) via a
classical channel who, whereupon, applies a unitary transformation on his
qubit according to this information. These transformations are the same
ones given in the original teleportation protocol [9]: If Alice gets |Φ+m〉 then
Bob does nothing, if she gets |Φ−m〉 he applies a σz operation, if Alice measures
|Ψ+m〉 then Bob applies σx and finally for |Ψ−m〉 he applies σzσx. Here, σz and
σx are the usual Pauli matrices (σz|0(1)〉=+(−)|0(1)〉 and σx|0(1)〉= |1(0)〉).
After the correct transformation Bob’s qubit is given by one of the following
possibilities,
|Φ+m〉 −→ |φB〉 =
α|0〉+ nm∗β|1〉√
|α|2 + |mnβ|2 , (10)
|Φ−m〉 −→ |φB〉 =
mα|0〉+ nβ|1〉√
|mα|2 + |nβ|2 , (11)
|Ψ+m〉 −→ |φB〉 =
nα|0〉+m∗β|1〉√|nα|2 + |mβ|2 , (12)
|Ψ−m〉 −→ |φB〉 =
mnα|0〉+ β|1〉√|mnα|2 + |β|2 . (13)
From now on, and without loss of generality [8], we consider n and m to be
real quantities. Therefore, looking at Eqs. (11) and (12) we realize that if
n = m the state with Bob is α|0〉 + β|1〉 and the protocol works perfectly.
There exist other possibilities, which come from Eqs. (10) and (13), namely,
nm = 1 or nm∗ = 1. But this is only possible if we have maximally entangled
states since those relations imply |n| = |m| = 1. For n = m the probability
of success is simply
Psuc = PΦ−n + PΨ+n =
2n2
(1 + n2)2
. (14)
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Therefore, if Alice knows the entanglement of the channel, which increases
monotonically with n, she can match her measurement basis (m = n) in
order to make the protocol work with probability Psuc. It is important to
note that if n 6= m Bob obtains a different state and the protocol fails. It is
this property that we explore in order to build our QKD scheme.
3. The QKD scheme
Let us assume that Bob prepares with equal probability two partially
entangled states, |Φ+n1〉 = N1(|00〉 + n1|11〉) and |Φ+n2〉 = N2(|00〉 + n2|11〉),
where n1 6= n2 and Nj = 1/
√
1 + n2j , j = 1, 2. For each state he keeps one
qubit and send the other one to Alice (See Fig. 1). Both parties previously
Figure 1: (Color online) Schematic representation of one run of the QKD protocol. a)
Bob prepares randomly a partially entangled state, either |Φ+
n1
〉 or |Φ+
n2
〉, without telling
Alice which one. Then he sends her one of the entangled qubits. b) Alice implements
the PQT choosing randomly between two generalized Bell measurements (GBM). She
teleports randomly either the state |+〉 or |−〉. She then tells Bob her measurement result,
|Φ±m〉 or |Ψ±m〉, but does not tell him which basis she used (if m = n1 or m = n2). c) With
this information Bob applies the right unitary operation (U) on his qubit and projects it
onto the X-basis |±〉 (XM). Then both parties broadcast the values of n and m. If n 6= m
they discard this run. If n = m and Alice’s GBM yielded |Φ−〉 or |Ψ+〉 they both agree
on the teleported qubit, which constitute one bit of the secret key.
agreed on the values of n1 and n2 but at this stage Bob does not tell Alice
the respective value of n for each entangled state he prepared. Alice, on
the other hand, prepares randomly two types of single qubit states, |±〉 =
(|0〉 ± |1〉)/√2, which are to be associated with the secret key she wants
to share with Bob. For example, the parties use the convention that |+〉
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represents the bit 0 and that |−〉 the bit 1. Note that we do not need
another encoding for the bits 0 and 1 that is non-orthogonal to the previous
one, as required by the BB84 protocol 2. Alice then uses each qubit received
from Bob to implement the PQT for each one of her randomly generated
states |±〉. In doing so, she also chooses in a random way whether to project
each pair of qubits (hers and Bob’s) to the GBS with m = n1 or m = n2.
Alice, however, does not inform Bob of the value of m but only which GBS
she gets. At the end of this stage Bob knows what her measurement results
were (but not m), which allows him to implement the right unitary operation
on his qubits. After that, each one of his qubits are described by one of the
four states given by Eqs. (10)-(13), with α = β = 1/2.
The last six steps of the protocol are as follows. First, Bob projects
his qubits onto the |±〉 basis. Second, Bob and Alice reveal in a public
channel the following information. Bob tells Alice which value of n (n1 or
n2) he has assigned to each partially entangled state whilst Alice tells him
the value of m (n1 or n2) for each GBM she made. Third, they keep all the
cases where she has rightly matched the entanglement of the channel with
the entanglement of the measuring basis, i.e., whenever the shared entangled
state was |Φ+nj〉 and Alice chose m = nj , j = 1, 2. Fourth, they discard all the
other cases since the PQT fails there (m 6= nj). Fifth, within the cases where
the matching condition is satisfied, Bob and Alice keep only those instances
where her measurement results were |Φ−〉 or |Ψ+〉, the so called successful
runs of the PQT. For those, and only those runs of the protocol, Alice and
Bob are sure they agree on the teleported state and consequently on the
random string of zeros and ones. Finally, the last step consists of using half
of the successful cases to test whether or not Eve has tried to tamper with
the key.
In an idealized situation, i.e., perfect detectors and no noise, they simply
broadcast half of their valid results in a public classical channel and check if
they always get the same bits. If they do, the remaining half of bits are their
secret key. If they fail to agree on the public data, they discard everything and
repeat the whole protocol again. However, noise and non-ideal detectors will
introduce some errors even when all the steps of the protocol are successful.
2We could have chosen another encoding for the bits 0 and 1. This would increase the
security of the present protocol on the expense of the key transmission rate. However, as
it is clear from the security analysis, this is not mandatory.
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Nevertheless, Alice and Bob can still achieve any desired level of security by
increasing the size of the shared key and employing classical reconciliation
protocols and privacy amplification techniques already developed for other
QKD schemes [11].
Assuming an ideal scenario, for instance, excellent detectors and efficient
measurement processes, we can calculate the maximum rate of how many
teleported qubits constitute the final secret key. We know that Alice imple-
ments the PQT half of the times making a GBM with m = n1 and half with
m = n2. Therefore, the total probability of success for all PQT is, according
to Eq. (14), n21/(1 + n
2
1)
2 + n22/(1 + n
2
2)
2. But half of the successful cases are
discarded to check for the presence of Eve, and the final rate becomes
P finalsuc =
n21
2(1 + n21)
2
+
n22
2(1 + n22)
2
. (15)
On the other hand, if we look at the BB84 protocol [3], we see that half of the
times Bob measures the qubits he receives from Alice using the same basis
she employed to prepare them and, within these successful runs, the other
half is used to test for the security of the protocol. This gives us, assuming no
loss during the transmission of the qubit and ideal detectors, a total idealized
rate of 1/4. Returning to the protocol presented here, it is not difficult to
see that P finalsuc < 1/4, no matter what the values of n1 and n2 are. (If they
are equal to one we have 1/4 but then the protocol is useless.) However, for
modest values of n1 and n2 (a little greater than 0.5) we get rates above 15%.
If we allow one of them to approach unity we do even better. For example,
if we have n1 = 0.5 and n2 = 0.9 we already obtain rates higher than 20%.
There exists, nevertheless, an important feature that we can easily achieve
employing this protocol that is unattainable using the BB84 protocol. We
can transform it into a sort of controlled QKD scheme introducing another
party (Charlie) who can decide whether or not Alice and Bob are allowed
to share a secret key even after they finished all steps of the protocol. In
order to do that, we let Charlie prepare and distribute the entangled states
|Φ+n1〉 and |Φ+n2〉 to Alice and Bob. Hence, if Charlie publicly announces the
values of n for each entangled state he prepared he can make the protocol
work without ever knowing the key. Otherwise, if he does not broadcast
this information, the protocol ultimately fails. Note that the probability of
success in this scenario, assuming Charlie broadcast all the values of n for
each entangled pair he prepares, is the same we had before, Eq. (15). His
role here is simply to distribute the entangled states between Alice and Bob,
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without changing the final success rate for the protocol. We also remark that
a similar third party control can be achieved using a different QKD scheme
based on maximally entangled Bell states [12].
At this point we wish to emphasize the main differences between the
present scheme and the BB84 and the E91 protocol. As described above,
here we can achieve a level of third party control that is unattainable using
the former two protocols. This is an important and practical characteristic
of this scheme that, as we show below, can also be extended to a fourth, fifth,
. . . , n-th party level of control. Moreover, in the present protocol the key is
never transmitted from Alice to Bob as in the BB84 protocol. Rather, it is
teleported from one party to the other, which gives an additional flexibility
for this protocol in its third party formulation. Indeed, once Alice and Bob
have shared the partially entangled states distributed by Charlie they can
easily exchange their roles. Instead of Alice teleporting the key to Bob, he
is the one who teleports the key to her. Also, contrary to the E91 protocol
where a maximally entangled state is directly responsible to the generation
of the secret key, here we use a non-maximally entangled state as a channel
through which the key is teleported. In other words, the non-maximally
entangled states of the present scheme have no direct role on the generation
of the secret key.
4. Security
The security of this protocol is based on the same premises of the BB84
protocol and, therefore, we can understand the security of the former by
recalling the security analysis [3] of the latter. The key ingredient here is
the recognition that there are two unknown sets of actions throughout the
implementation of the BB84 protocol that are only publicly revealed at the
end of it: the basis in which Alice prepared her qubits and the basis in
which Bob measured the qubits received from Alice. A similar thing happens
for the present protocol. We have two unknown sets of actions throughout
each run of the protocol that are revealed only at its end: the entanglement
of the shared qubits between Alice and Bob and what basis Alice used to
implement the GBM. This lack of information prevents Eve from always
obtaining the right bit being sent from Alice to Bob without being noticed.
As we show below, the laws of quantum mechanics forbid Eve from acquiring
information about the key being transmitted without disturbing the quantum
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state carrying it if she does not know which entangled state is shared between
Alice and Bob.
Let us assume, for definiteness, that in one of the runs of the protocol
Alice prepared the state |+〉 and that Eve, somehow, replaced the entangled
state produced by Bob with one produced by her. Eve wants the state
prepared by Alice to be teleported to her. By doing so she thinks she can
obtain information on the key. However, she does not know which GBM Alice
implemented to perform the PQT (m = n1 or m = n2). This information
is only revealed after Bob confirms he measured his qubit. She only knows
that the measurement result of Alice is, say, |Φ−〉. (This is the best scenario
for Eve.) Therefore, Eve’s qubit is described by Eq. (11), |φE〉 = m|0〉+n|1〉√
m2+n2
,
which can be written as,
|φE〉 = 1√
2(m2 + n2)
[(m+ n)|+〉+ (m− n)|−〉] . (16)
Looking at Eq. (16) we see that unless Eve guessed correctly Alice’s choice
form (and this only happens half of the times), preparing the right entangled
state with n = m, we have a superposition of the states |+〉 and |−〉. This
implies that she obtains the wrong bit being transmitted with probability
Pwrong = (m−n)2/(2(m2+n2)) = 1/2−mn/(m2+n2). In other words, since
we have a superposition of the right and wrong answers quantum mechanics
forbids Eve from always getting the right one with a single measurement. It
is clear now that this is similar to the argument used to prove the security
of the BB84 protocol. Hence, no matter what Eve does, if she prepared the
wrong entangled state and Bob the right one, she will be caught trying to
tamper with the key when Alice and Bob publicly compare part of it. This is
true since Eve cannot with certainty send Bob another qubit which mimics
the right one. Furthermore, Eq. (16) tells us that the greater the difference
between n1 and n2 the more likely will Eve be detected. We can see this by
noting that Pwrong increases as a function of |m − n| or, equivalently, as a
function of the difference in entanglement between the channels. Lastly, the
chances of Eve being caught also increases with the size of the string of bits
being publicly announced.
We can also estimate the optimal range of parameters (n1 and n2) for this
protocol, assuming we want to maximize the transmission rate while at the
same time minimizing the chances of Eve guessing the correct qubit being
teleported. In other words, we want to maximize a function proportional to
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PwrongPsuc, where Pwrong is, as given above, the probability of Eve guessing
the wrong qubit and Psuc is Eq. (15), the total rate of success in the trans-
mission of the key. Both Pwrong and Psuc are now considered functions of n1
and n2. A simple numerical analysis shows that the best strategies occur for
n1 ≈ 1 and n2 ≈ 0 (and vice-versa), while the worst cases for Alice and Bob
occur when n1 ≈ n2.
Note that the security check outlined above is an idealization. In real-
life situations we always have noise and imperfect devices that give wrong
answers even in the absence of Eve. However, this can be controlled using
classical reconciliation protocols and privacy amplification [11]. A more de-
tailed security analysis based on bounds for the mutual information between
Alice, Bob, and Eve using, for example, the techniques of Refs. [13, 14], is
beyond our goals here and is left for future work.
5. Extensions of the QKD scheme
The QKD scheme presented here is very versatile and allows for arbitrary
control over the protocol parameters. This can be achieved by introducing
two extensions, where one increases its security and the other increases the
distance of reliable transmission of the key. The security of the protocol
is increased by allowing Bob to generate more than two partially entangled
states. For example, instead of just creating the states |Φ+nj〉, j = 1, 2, he
can create three or more states with different n. With only two states, Eve
can guess the right GBM in half of the successful runs of the PQT. However,
with more entangled states, her chances are reduced to 1/N , where N is
the number of partially entangled states produced by Bob. On the other
hand, this increase in security reduces the transmission rate of the key since
it becomes less likely that Alice and Bob achieve the matching condition
(m = n).
To extend the distance of reliable key transmissions we can use quantum
repeater [15] stations. In this scenario it is the first station (the closest to
Alice) that generates the partially entangled states and then publicize the
values of n, only after Bob measures his qubits. The other stations use
maximally entangled states to successively teleport Alice’s qubit to Bob.
Note that security increases if other repeater stations use partially entangled
states too. The repeater stations can also be used to extend the third party
control described before to any number of parties. Indeed, if we allow each
station to freely choose its own partially entangled states we are increasing
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the number of parties that can decide whether or not Alice and Bob will
share a secret key. This is true for the protocol will work if, and only if,
all the repeater stations disclose to Alice and Bob which partially entangled
states they generated at each run of the protocol.
6. Experimental feasibility
While noise and decoherence of entangled qubits usually result in mixed
states [16, 17], partially-entangled states used in the aforementioned QKD
protocol can be considered in the scenario of coupling to a zero-temperature
bath [18]. In this regime dynamical control of decoherence [19, 20, 18] al-
lows one to determine the amount of partial entanglement of the channel by
properly tuning the relative decoherence between the qubits. Thus, the party
sending the partially entangled states (either Bob in the standard QKD or
Charlie in the controlled version) can select the degree of partial entangle-
ment and is not restricted by the amount of noise in the system.
7. Summary
We showed that partially entangled states are useful resources for the
construction of a direct QKD scheme by the proper use of probabilistic tele-
portation protocols. This has an interesting implication on the practical
implementation of entangled based QKD schemes, as it is extremely diffi-
cult to produce maximally entangled qubits. Using the protocol presented
here, one can alleviate the experimental demands on the production of en-
tangled pairs without rendering QKD inoperable. Furthermore, the present
partially entangled state based QKD scheme is flexible enough that we were
able extend it in at least three directions, each one augmenting its usability.
The first one turned the protocol into a controlled QKD scheme, where a
third party decides whether or not Alice and Bob are able to share a secret
key. Then we demonstrated how one can increase its security by letting the
parties use more and more different partially entangled states to implement
one of the steps of the QKD protocol, namely, the probabilistic teleportation
protocol. And third, we discussed how the use of quantum repeaters extends
the distance of reliable key transmission without diminishing the key rate.
Finally, the present QKD protocol naturally leads to new interesting ques-
tions. For instance, can we increase the key transmission rate using partially
entangled qudits instead of qubits? Is there any possible way of devising a
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similar approach using mixed entangled states? Or using continuous variable
entangled systems? Can we do better by using different types of entangled
qubit-like states, such as the cluster state [21] or the cluster-type coherent
entangled states [22]? It is our hope that the ideas presented here might lead
to clues on how to answer these questions.
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